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TO

SECURE SECOND DWI TEST

Police arrested the defendant for suspicion of driving while
intoxicated (DWI). I After the police gave the defendant his Miranda
warnings 2 at the police station, the defendant requested to
telephone his attorney. 3 The police refused his request. 4 The
defendant also requested an independent blood test after the
5
chemical breath test, but the police took no action on this request.
The arresting officer did, however, call the defendant's wife. 6 The
defendant was not able to call his attorney until the police released
him two and one-half hours later. 7 His attorney, however,
1. McNutt v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 7, -,
648 P.2d 122, 124 (1982). The Arizona
Supreme Court consolidated three cases on appeal because they involved similar issues and the same
parties. One case was an appeal from a superior court special action order granting defendant
McNutt a dismissal of a driving while intoxicated (DWI) charge. The second case was a special
action taken from the superior court's affirmance of McNutt's revoked probation based on the same
DWI charge. The third case was an appeal of the superior court's denial of defendant McNutt's
motion to dismiss and its affirmance of the city court's actions. Id. at -, 648 P.2d at 123-24.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), In Miranda the United States Supreme Court
announced the following procedural safeguards: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
at 444.
3. 133 Ariz. at -, 648 P.2d at 124.
4. Id. at __, 648 P.2d at 124. The police refused the defendant's request without apparent
reason. Id. Cf Scarborough v. Kellum, 386 F. Supp. 1360, 1363-64 (N.D. Miss. 1975),a'ffd, 525
F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1976). In Scarborough the arresting officer offered to make a phone call on the
defendant's behalf, but the defendant refused because he could not make his own call. The court held
that a policy of making the telephone call for the DWI arrestee was substantial compliance with an
arrestee's constitutional rights. 386 F. Supp. at 1363-64.
5. 133 Ariz. at -,
648 P.2d at 124. See Annot., 78 A.L.R.21 905, 905-07 (1961 & Supp.
1982) (constitutional right of DWI suspect to call physician to obtain a second test).
6. 133 Ariz. at

-, 648 P.2d at 124.

7. Id. The Arizona Supreme Court noted in a footnote that "it is crucial for both the state and
the defendant to gather evidence relevant to intoxication close in time to when the defendant
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informed him that too much time had passed since the arrest to
obtain an independent blood test of any evidentiary value.8 The
defendant claimed that the State violated his right to counsel and a
fair trial under rule 6.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure 9 and the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 1 0 The defendant argued that by preventing him from
telephoning his attorney, the State denied him the right to gather
exculpatory evidence by means of an independent test. 1 The
Arizona Supreme Court applied constitutional standards of due
process' 2 and section 28-692 (F) of the Arizona Revised Statutes
allegedly committed the crime. Otherwise, any alcohol that may have been in the blood will have
n.2, 648 P.2d at 125 n.2.
decomposed before the blood can be tested." Id.at __
8. 133 Ariz. at -, 648 P.2d at 124. Contra In re Howard, 208 Cal. App. 2d 709, 25 Cal. Rptr.
590 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). In Howardthe defendant requested that her physician, who was two hours
driving time away, be contacted to make a blood test. 208 Cal. App. 2d at -, 25 Cal. Rptr. at
591. The officer refused due to the distance and time involved, but offered to take the defendant to a
hospital 10 minutes away. Id. The defendant refused and was released from jail 20 to 30 minutes
after her arrest. The defendant made no effort after release to have a blood test taken. Id. An expert
testified that a blood test would still have probative value up to five hours after the arrest. The court
held that the defendant was not denied due process. Id. at -. , 25 Cal. Rptr. at 595. See also Sharp
v. Commonwealth, 414 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (two hour delay before allowing DWI
suspect to telephone her attorney was not unreasonable because delay was caused by her condition).
9. 133 Ariz. at -, 648 P.2d at 124. Rule 6.1(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
A defendant shall be entitled to be represented by counsel in any criminal proceeding,
except in those petty offenses such as traffic violations where there is no prospect of
imprisonment or confinement after a judgment of guilty. The right to be represented
shall include the right to consult in private with an attorney, or his agent, as soon as
feasible after a defendant is taken into custody, at reasonable times thereafter, and
sufficiently in advance of a proceeding to allow adequate preparation therefor.
ARIM. R. CRIM. P. 6.1(a).
10. 133 Ariz. at...,
provides:

648 P.2d at 124. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST.amend. VI.
11. 133 Ariz. at -, 648 P.2d at 124. See McCormick v. Municipal Court, 195 Cal. App. 2d
819,
-, 16 Cal. Rptr. 211, 215 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (denial of due process when the one phone
call allowed the defendant was used to obtain bail and the defendant was denied a reasonable
opportunity to call a physician to obtain a timely sample of his blood).
-, 374 P.2d 801,
12. 133 Ariz. at -, 648 P.2d at 124. See In re Martin, 58 Cal. 2d 509,
803, 24 Cal. Rptr. 833, 835 (1962) (when the defendant made a reasonable and sincere effort to
obtain blood tests at two hospitals, but hospital personnel refused because police withheld
authorization, refusal by the police was analogous to suppression of evidence and violated due
127 A.2d 79, 82 (1956) (when the physician the
process); State v. Munsey, 152 Me. 198, -,
defendant requested was occupied, the police permitted the defendant to call his wife 15 minutes
later, and the defendant did not call another doctor or request his wife to get one for him, the police
did not deny the defendant a reasonable opportunity to obtain a second test); People v. Burton, 13
Mich. App. 203, 163 N.W.2d 823 (1969) (failure of the police to inform the defendant in a timely
fashion that his physician was not contacted deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to gather
competent evidence for his defense). Cf Harlan v. State, 430 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tex. Crim. App.
1968) (when there was nothing in record to show that the defendant requested, but was refused, the
right to obtain a sobriety test at his own expense, mere failure to take the defendant before a
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Annotated 3 to give a DWI suspect the right to obtain an
independent blood test.1 4 The court determined that by denying the
defendant the chance to have his attorney arrange for the test, the
State violated the defendant's right to consult with an attorney as
soon as possible after arrest.' 5 The Arizona Supreme Court held
that the State's action prevented the defendant from obtaining
exculpatory evidence no longer available, thus foreclosing a fair
trial. t 6 McNutt V. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 7, 648 P.2d 122 (1982).
The defendant in McNutt argued that the State, by denying
him the opportunity to call his attorney to arrange for an
independent test, suppressed any possible exculpatory evidence he
might have obtained. 17 The basis for this argument was Brady v.
Maryland,' the leading case on suppression of evidence. In Brady
the United States Supreme Court held that suppression of
evidence, favorable to the defendant, by the prosecution violated
the due process clause when the evidence was material to the
defendant's guilt or punishment. 19 In Brady, a murder case, the
prosecution withheld statements made by the defendant's
20
companion, in which the companion admitted the actual murder.
Because the statement of the companion would have aided in
mitigating the punishment for the offense, the Court held that
suppression of the confession was a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.21
magistrate for 12 hours did not show that police denied the defendant the right to obtain a sobriety

test at his own expense).
13. 133 Ariz. at __,

648 P.2d at 124. Section 28-692(F) of the Arizona Revised Statutes

Annotated provided as follows:

The person tested may have a physician or a qualified technician, chemist,
registered nurse or other qualified person of his own choosing administer a chemical
test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law enforcement

officer. The failure or inability to obtain an additional test by a person shall not
preclude the admission of evidence relating to the test or tests taken at the direction of
a law enforcement officer.
ARMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(F) (1976) (current version at ARIz. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(I)
(Supp. 1981-1982)).

14. 133 Ariz. at -,

648 P.2d at 124. See State v. Snipes, 478 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Mo.) (when

the defendant received the requested independent blood test, due process did not require the police to

transport the defendant to a hospital so that a physician could determine by physical observation
whether he was intoxicated), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 979 (1972).
15. 133 Ariz. at -, 648 P.2d at 124.
16. Id. at __,
648 P.2d at 125. The court also held that the State could not revoke the
defendant's probation based on the DWI incident because the State's actions prevented the
defendant from gathering evidence relevant to whether he was driving while intoxicated. Id. The
State's actions denied the defendant the right to a fair hearing on the petition to revoke probation. Id.
17. Id. at-,
648 P.2d at 124.

18. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
19. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See Comment, Judicial Response to Governmental
Loss or Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 542 (1972)

evidence).
20. 373 U.S. at 84.
21. Id. at 86.

(further case law on suppression of
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In a later case, United States v. Keogh,2 2 a jury convicted the
23
defendant for conspiracy to influence, obstruct, or impede justice.
The district court denied the defendant's appeal on a writ of coram
nobis, which alleged that the prosecution had knowingly suppressed
exculpatory evidence and used perjured testimony. 24 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined that
when the suppression of evidence was not deliberate and no request
was made, the standard of materiality must be considerably higher,
to grant relief. 25 The court held that the trial judge should hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Government's failure
to turn over to the defense an unrequested FBI report on the
financial records of a prosecution witness would have altered the
result at trial. 26 Thus, to constitute a violation of the defendant's
due process rights under the Brady line of cases, the prosecution
must have withheld evidence that was both material and favorable
27
to the defendant.
Several jurisdictions hold that the denial of an opportunity to
procure a blood test on a DWI charge denies due process because
the denial may be suppressing evidence of the defendant's
sobriety. 28 In Brown v. Municipal Court29 the police arrested the
defendant for DWI and administered a breathalyzer at the police
station.3 0 The police then transported the defendant to the hospital
because of possible neck injuries.3 1 At the hospital the defendant
requested a blood test and offered to pay for it.32 The police officer
22. 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.), on remand, 289 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 885 (2d
Cir. 1969).
23. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 139 (2d Cir.), on remand, 289 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1969).
24. 391 F.2d at 140.
25. Id. at 147. The court reasoned that "[t]o invalidate convictions in such cases because a
combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense,
but not likely to have changed the verdict would create unbearable burdens and uncertainties." Id.
at 148.
26. Id. at 148-49.
27. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972). In Moore the Court held that the
standards by which the prosecution's conduct was to be measured were: "(a) suppression by the
prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence's favorable character for the defense, and
(c) the materiality of the evidence." Id. In United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
the court held that the Brady disclosure requirement applied to a case in which the evidence requested
by the defendant has been lost or discarded. Id. at 653.
28. For cases holding that it is a denial of due process to prohibit a defendant from obtaining a
second test, see supra note 12.
29. 86 Cal. App. 3d 357, 150 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Ct. App. 1978).
30. Brown v. Municipal Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 357,
-,
150 Cal. Rptr. 216, 219 (Ct. App.
1978).
31. Id.
32. Id. See In re Koehne, 54 Cal. 2d 757,
-. , 356 P.2d 179, 181, 8 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437 (1960)
(when the defendant indicated his desire to have blood tests taken only at times and places when
arrangements for a doctor could not be reasonably made and he never stated that he would bear the
expense of calling his doctor, the police did not violate the defendant's rights); In re Newbern, 175
Cal. App. 2d 862, -,
1 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83 (Ct. App. 1959) (refusal to permit person charged with
drunkenness in a public place the opportunity to call a doctor of his choice at his expense in an effort

1983]

CASE COMMENT

483

33
accompanying the defendant, however, refused to allow the test.
The officer stated that the defendant would have to return to the
hospital after his release from custody to have the test
administered. 34 The police did not release the defendant from jail
until four and one-half or five and one-half hours later. 35 The
California Court of Appeals held that the police officer's refusal to
allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to obtain a timely
blood test amounted to a suppression of the evidence and, thus,
constituted a denial of due process. 36 Therefore, while it was not the
37
duty or obligation of the police officer to administer a blood test,
the officer could not refuse the reasonable efforts of the defendant to
obtain a timely sample of his blood without violating the
38
defendant's due process rights.
39
One of the defendant's arguments in McNutt v. Superior Court
was that the State violated his right to counsel under rule 6.1 of the
Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 40 and the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution. 41 Beginning with Powell v.
Alabama42 the United States Supreme Court has made a number of
important decisions affecting the criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel. 43 The United States Supreme Court
expanded the right to include the assistance of counsel in pretrial
procedures that are "critical stages" of the criminal proceedings in
Hamilton v. Alabama.4 4 In Hamilton the arraignment was held to be a
critical stage of the criminal proceedings because available defenses
could be irretrievably lost if not asserted at that time. 45 Therefore,
to obtain the only evidence that could vindicate him of the charge was unreasonable and a denial of
due process).
33.86 Cal. App. 3d at -, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
34. Id.
35. Id. at -,
150 Cal. Rptr. at 220. The court noted that a blood test made after the delendant's release would have been too late. Id. For cases holding that the blood test would not have
been too late, see supra note 8.
36. 86 Cal. App. 3d at -, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
37. See State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 753 (N.D. 1981) (State not required to make a sample
of the defendant's breath, taken at the time of the breathalyzer examination, available to the
defendant for independent testing).
38. See In re Martin, 58 Cal. 2d 509, 512. 374 P.2d 801, 803, 24 Cal. Rptr. 833, 835 (1962)
(when the authorities, "through affirmative action or by the imposition of their rules and
regulations." frustrate a defendant's efforts to obtain a second test, it is a denial ofdue process).
39. 133 Ariz. 7.648 P.2d 122 (1982).
40. McNutt v. Superior Court. 133 Ariz. at _ 648 P.2d at 124. For the text of rule 6.1(a),
see supra note 9.
41. 133 Ariz. at _
648 P.2d at 124. For the text of the sixth amendment, see supra note 10.
42. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (failure of trial court to give ignorant and illiterate defendants
reasonable time and opportunity to obtain counsel violated due process clause of fourteenth
amendment).
43, See Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387. 401. 404-05 (1977) (right to counsel when police
indirectly interrogate the defendant after the defendant has been formally charged with an offense;
no %%aiverwhen defendant consistently relied on advice of counsel): Crooker v. California. 357 U.S.
433. 439 (1958) (if a pretrial proceeding would prejudice defendant at trial because of absence of
"'fundamental fairness.'' the right to counsel attaches at that proceeding).
44. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
45. Hamilton v. Alabama. 368 U.S. 52.54 (1961).
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the defendant was entitled to representation at arraignment. 46
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright established the indigent's sixth amendment right to
counsel at the expense of the state.4 7 The Court extended the right
to court appointed counsel to misdemeanor crimes resulting in
49
48
imprisonment in Argersinger v. Hamlin. Then in Kirby v. Illinois
the United States Supreme Court determined that the sixth
amendment right to counsel arose at the initiation of the judicial
proceedings, when the police had formally charged the defendant. 50
Throughout this expansion of the right to counsel guarantee, the
critical issue in determining the defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel was whether the particular stage in the criminal
51
proceeding was critical.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has never
addressed the issue of when a sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches in a DWI prosecution. Courts generally have found that
there is no sixth amendment or legal right to counsel at the time the
accused must decide whether to comply with the request for a
sobriety test. 5 2 A small number of courts have, however, recognized a constitutional right to counsel before submitting to a
sobriety test. 53 Other courts have recognized a limited state
46. Id. at 55. See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing is a critical
stage that entitled accused to aid ofcounsel); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (confrontation is
a critical stage that required counsel); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (right to counsel at
a postindictment lineup); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (postindictment lineup was
critical stage that entitled defendant to counsel); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(once adversary proceedings had begun the accused had a right to counsel when the government
interrogated him); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (accused had a right to counsel prior to
arraignment); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam) (preliminary hearing was a
critical stage because defendant entered a plea without counsel).
47. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
49. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
50. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). Seealso United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310,
313 (1973). In Ash the Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel extended only to events
during which "the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his
adversary" and when "the accused-was confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by
his expert adversary, or by both." Id.
51. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (photo display is not a critical stage); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (counsel not required at pretrial confrontation because right to counsel
does not attach until the State initiates prosecution).
, 245
52. See, e.g., Price v. North Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 36 N.C. App. 698, S.E.2d 518, 522 (Ct. App.) (although there is no right to the presence of counsel at the
administration of a sobriety test, the defendant has a statutory right to a reasonable time in which to
call an attorney prior to taking a test), appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 551, 248 S.E.2d 728 (1978); Agnew
v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 298 (N.D. 1974) (no constitutional right to counsel before submitting to
a chemical test). .
53. See, e.g., Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646, 654 (D.S.D.) (DWI suspect had a
constitutional right to request to speak with an attorney prior to making the decision whether to
,
submit to testing), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547,_
178 S.E.2d 462, 466-67 (1b71) (defendant denied constitutional and statutory right to communicate
with counsel and friends at critical time when denial deprived him of any opportunity to confront
303 N.E.2d 925,
State's witnesses with other testimony); Troy v. Curry, 36 Ohio Misc. 144, -,
927 (1973) (refusal to allow DWI defendant to consult with counsel violates the sixth and fourteenth
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statutory right to counsel before submitting to a breathalyzer test. 4
These courts based their holdings on general right to counsel
statutes 55 or court rules.5 6 This limited right to counsel only existed
when the telephone call or access to counsel did not unreasonably
delay the administration of the sobriety test. 57 Other jurisdictions
recognize a limited sixth amendment right to counsel immediately
after the defendant has taken a sobriety test and is charged with an
offense. 58 A number of courts hold that the right to counsel does not
license revocation hearings are a civil not a
apply because driver's
9
criminal matter.5
In City of Tacoma v. Heater60 the Washington Supreme Court
held that the critical stage in DWI cases arose immediately after the
police officers had conducted their sobriety tests, interrogated the
defendant, and charged him with the offense. 6 1 In a later case, State
amendments).
In State v. Welch the court concluded that when a serious criminal case was involved, the request
to submit to a chemical test could rise to the level of a critical stage in the proceedings. State v.
Welch, 135 Vt. 316, -, 376 A.2d 351, 355 (1977). The court held that the police may not, without
reason, deny access between an accused and his attorney when the accused requests such access and
it is readily available and will not interfere with the investigation. Id. But cf State v. Petkus, 110
269 A.2d 123, 125 (1970) (blood test not a critical stage requiring assistance of
N.H. 394, -,
counsel).
54. See, e.g., Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976)
(statutory right to consult with lawyer before making decision to submit to chemical test provided
call does not unreasonably delay administration of test); Seders v. Powell, 39 N.C. App. 491, 250
S.E.2d 690, aff'd, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979) (defendant had right to call attorney within
the 30 minute statutory period before deciding whether to take breathalyzer test); McNulty v. Curry,
42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 328 N.E.2d 798 (1975) (decision whether to take blood alcohol test not a critical
stage ofcriminal prosecution; state statute permitted defendant to contact attorney before submitting
to test).
55. For an example of a general right to counsel statute, see MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 481.10 (West
1971).
56. See Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. App. 1975) (under court rule DWI defendant
has right to representation and advice ofcounsel at all times after his arrest).
57. See People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, -, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353 (Ct. App. 1968) (denial of
defendant's request for opportunity to phone attorney before submitting to test violated his privilege
of access to counsel when there was no danger of delay).
58. See State v. Krozel, 24 Conn. Supp. 266, -, 190 A.2d 61, 62, 66 (Super. Ct. 1963) (when
defendant arrested on suspicion of DWI, given sobriety tests, and charged with offense and police
denied defendant's requests to call his attorney or wife, court held the police denied the defendant the
constitutional right to assistance of counsel); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, -, 610 P.2d
893, 899 (time immediately after DWI arrest and charging when defendant must immediately make
decision whether to submit to chemical test and arrange for further testing is critical stage to which
constitutional right to counsel attaches), vacated sub nor. Washington v. Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. 977,
aff'd on remand, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980); City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733,
409 P.2d 867 (1966) (constitutional right to counsel; police may not prevent arrested drunk driver
from contacting retained counsel for period of four hours after arrest; critical stage occurs
immediately after police conducted sobriety tests, interrogated defendant, and charged him with the
offense).
59. See Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966) (driver's license
revocation proceeding not a criminal prosecution, therefore, no right to counsel); Finocchairo v.
Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403 (revocation of driver's license by
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles is civil matter; right to counsel applies to criminal proceedings),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962); Brewer v. State, 23 Wash. App. 412, 595 P.2d 949 (Ct. App. 1979)
(no right to counsel exists because driver's license revocation proceedings are not a criminal matter).
60. 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966). The Heater
61. City ofTacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d 733, -,
court's rationale was that the denial of counsel immediately after the police arrested the defendant
and conducted sobriety tests made it impossible for the defendant to have disinterested witnesses
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v. Fitzsimmons,62 the Washington Supreme Court held that the
arresting officer must provide any indigent DWI defendant with
access to a telephone. 63 The arresting officer also had to provide the
defendant with the number of a public defender organization or the
numbers of attorneys who had expressed a willingness to serve as
appointed counsel for indigents. 64 The court concluded that
telephone consultation immediately after police charged the
defendant was sufficient to provide the defendant with adequate
65
legal assistance and a fair trial.
The Washington Supreme Court recognized a limited sixth
amendment right to counsel immediately after the police
administered a sobriety test and charged the defendant with an
a
offense. In contrast, a federal district court recognized 66
test.
sobriety
a
to
submitting
before
counsel
to
constitutional right
The Heles v. South Dakota67 court held that when the defendant
requests to speak with an attorney prior to testing, he must be
allowed a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. 68 The
court stated that if the defendant could not reach an attorney by
telephone within a reasonable period of time, the defendant would
have to decide whether to submit to a chemical test without
69
consulting counsel to prevent delay in administration of the test.
Thus, the courts vary in their interpretations of when the right to
counsel attaches in a DWI proceeding and in the bases for their
holdings.
As noted above, several courts held that the denial of an
opportunity to procure a second test on a DWI charge denied due
process. 70 Faced with this same issue, the Arizona Supreme Court
in McNutt v. Superior Court71 determined that the right of a defendant
to obtain an independent test rested on the constitutional standards
of due process 72 and the state statutory right to have an additional
observe his condition and to obtain a blood test by a doctor. Id. These were the only means by which
the defendant might have proved his innocence. Id.
62. 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893, vacatedsub nom. Washington v. Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. 977,
qff'don remand, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980).
610 P.2d 893, 899, vacated sub nom.
63. State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, -,
Washington v. Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. 977, aff'don remand, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980).
64. 93 Wash. 2d at -, 610 P.2d at 899.
65. Id. at - ,610 P.2d at 900.
66. Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir.
1982).
67. 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacatedas moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).
68. 530 F. Supp. at 654.
69. Id. at 653. See People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968)
(no right to refuse chemical test until lawyer is present if lawyer cannot be reached promptly).
70. For cases holding that preventing a defendant from obtaining a second test violates due
process, see supra notes 11, 12 & 32.
71. 133 Ariz. 7,648 P.2d 122 (1982).
72. McNutt v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 7, -, 648 P.2d 122, 124 (1982).
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test administered. 73 The McNutt court cited Smith v. Cada74 in which
the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant had
the right to obtain an independent blood test. In Cada the police
refused to grant the defendant's request to call his attorney or
75
release him from jail on bail to obtain an independent blood test.
The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the police had
unreasonably interfered with Cada's right to obtain evidence for his
defense and, thus, had denied him his due process right to a fair
trial. 76
In McNutt the Arizona Supreme Court pointed out that the
State's refusal of the defendant's request to telephone his attorney
denied the defendant the right to have his attorney arrange for an
independent test. 77 The court reasoned that this denial violated the
defendant's right guaranteed by rule 6.1 (a) of the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure7 8 to confer with counsel as soon as feasible
after custody. 79 In considering the denial of counsel issue the
McNutt court applied the rationale of the New York Court of
Appeals in People v. Gursey80 and the Arizona Court of Appeals in
State ex rel. Webb v. City Court.8 '
In People v. Gursey82 the New York Court of Appeals held that
police officers could not, without justification, prevent access
between the defendant and his lawyer before the defendant
submitted to a chemical test if such access would not interfere
unduly with the test results. 83 The court determined that granting
the defendant's request would not have interfered substantially
with the investigative procedure because the defendant would have
concluded a call to an attorney in a matter of minutes.8 4 The court
further stated, however, that there could be no recognition of an
absolute right to refuse a chemical test until a lawyer was present
73. Id. For the text of the Arizona statute, see supra note 13.
74. 114 Ariz. 510, 562 P.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1977).
75. Smith v. Cada, 114 Ariz. 510, -,
562 P.2d 390, 391 (Ct. App. 1977). In Cada the
defendant requested an attorney while being transported to the police station and upon arrival at the
station. Although he had sufficient cash to post bail, police ignored his request. Id.
76. Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 394. See also Smith v. Ganske, 114 Ariz. 515, 562 P.2d 395 (Ct. App.
1977). In Ganske the police failed to provide the defendant "with a 'reasonable opportunity' to
determine the reason for the delay in making bail or to allow bail to be posted" by a friend. Id. at
-,
562 P.2d at 397. The court held that this deprived the defendant of an opportunity to obtain
independent evidence of his sobriety and, accordingly, deprived the defendant of due process. Id.
77. McNutt v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 7, -, 648 P.2d 122, 124 (1982).
78. For the text of rule 6.1, see supra note 9.
79. 133 Ariz. at-,
648 P.2d at 124.
80. 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351,292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968).
81.25 Ariz. App. 214, 542 P.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1975).
82. 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968).
83. People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, __,
239 N.E.2d 351, 352, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418
(1968).
84. Id. at -, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
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because the test results were admissible in evidence only if the test
85
had been taken within two hours of the arrest.
In State ex rel. Webb v. City Court86 the police arrested the
defendant for DWI. The defendant made several requests to
telephone his attorney. 8 7 A police officer informed the defendant
that he had a right to an additional test,8 8 but the defendant did not
request a second test.8 9 The police honored the defendant's request
to telephone his attorney when the defendant was booked at the
jail. 90 The court noted that the defendant was not entitled to
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to submit to the
breathalyzer test. 91 The court held that because the police honored
the defendant's request to telephone his attorney and informed him
of his right to obtain a second test, there was no denial of his right
92
to counsel.
':A-pplyfng the reasoning of Gusey and Webb to the McNutt case,
the Arizona Supreme Court determined that allowing the
defendant an opportunity to call his attorney would not have
93
caused undue delay in the DWI investigation and arrest process.
The court recognized that because alcohol in the blood stream
decomposes over time, the defendant had "no right to delay by
demanding to consult with counsel before being required to choose
between a blood alcohol test or possible driver's license
suspension.
Referring to State v. Gursey, 95 the Arizona Supreme
Court noted that the police should promptly give a defendant the
opportunity to contact counsel if he demands it after he takes or
96
refuses to take the test.
",94

85. Id. See Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.) (if defendant could not reach an
attorney, defendant would have to decide whether to submit to test without assistance of counsel),
twcatedas moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).
86.25 Ariz. App. 214, 542 P.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1975).
87. State ex rel. Webb v. City Court, 25 Ariz. App..214, __,
542 P.2d 407, 408 (Ct. App.
1975).
88. Id. at __
, 542 P.2d at 409. Compare Connolly v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 500, __
, 487 P.2d
1050, 1052 (1971) (failure to inform defendant ofstatutory right to have additional tests administered
invalidated revocation of defendant's driver's license for failure to submit to chemical test) with City
of Farmington v.Joseph, 91 N.M. 414,
-. , 575 P.2d 104, 107 (Ct. App. 1978) (failure of police to
advise defendant of right to additional test is not error) and Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
1 Cal. 3d 74, 78-79. 459 P.2d 900, 903-04, 81 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351-52 (1969) (failure of officer to
advise defendant that he could obtain additional test at his own expense did not excuse refusal to
submit to test or deprive defendant of due process of law).
89. 25 Ariz. App. at 542 P.2d at 409. qf. People v. Kingston, 216 Cal. App. 2d 879.
31 Cal. Rptr. 450. 451 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1963) (when defendant never requested that police
call physician to administer blood alcohol test. defendant not denied reasonable opportunity to
obtain evidence lbr defense).
90. 25 Ariz. App. at __
542 P.2d at 409.
91. Id. See Campbell v. Superior Court. 106 Ariz. 542. 479 P.2d 685 (1971) (DWI defendant not
entitled to assistance ofcounsel in deciding whether to take chemical test).
92. 25 Ariz. App. at
. 542 P.2d at 409.
93. McNtit v. Superior Court. 133 Ariz. 7.__, 648 P.2d 122. 124-25 (1982).
94. Id. at n.2. 648 P.2d at 125 n.2.
95.22 N.Y.2d 224. 239 N.E.2d 351. 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968).
96. .lr.Vutt. 133 Ariz. at __
n.2. 648 P.2d at 125 n.2.
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The Arizona Supreme Court in McNutt further noted that if
the defendant was indigent and could not afford counsel, the State
did not have to wait until the court appointed counsel to continue
detention procedures. 9 7 In the indigent defendant situation the
court determined that the police should allow the defendant an
opportunity to contact a friend or relative to arrange for an
independent test. 98 The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the
State's action in denying the defendant an opportunity to telephone
his attorney resulted in preventing the defendant from gathering
exculpatory evidence.9 9 Therefore, constitutional standards of due
process and Arizona statutory law and court rules entitled the DWI
suspect to obtain an independent test and to call his attorney to
arrange for that test. 100
The McNutt court indicated that the determining factor was
whether the defendant's call would unduly delay the DWI
investigation and arrest. 1°1 Whether a defendant in Arizona may
call his attorney before taking a breathalyzer test, however,
remains unclear after McNutt.
The McNutt court cited People v. Gursey, 10 2 which held that the
denial of the defendant's request for an opportunity to call his
lawyer before taking a chemical test violated his privilege of access
to counsel when granting the defendant's request would not have
interfered substantially with the investigative procedure. 10 3 By
citing Gursey the Arizona Supreme Court may have implied that a
defendant may call his attorney before taking a chemical test if it
would not unduly delay the DWI investigation. This argument was
further evidenced by the court's statement in a footnote that "a
defendant has no right to delay by demanding to consult with
counsel before being required to choose between a blood alcohol
test or possible driver's license suspension.' '104
97. Id. But see State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, -,

610 P.2d 893, 899 (officer should

provide indigent defendant with access to phone and number of public defender organization or
numbers of attorneys willing to represent indigent clients), vacated sub nora.Washington v.

Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. 977, aff'don remand, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980).
98. McNutt, 133 Ariz. at - n.2, 648 P.2d at 125 n.2.
99. Id. at -, 648 P.2d at 125.
100. Id. at -, 648 P.2d at 124-25.
101. Id. at-.,
648 P.2d at 124.

102. Id. (citing People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968)).
103. People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, __,
239 N.E.2d 351, 352, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418
(1968).
104. McNutt, 133 Ariz. at n.2, 648 P.2d at 125 n.2 (emphasis added). Section 28-691 (B) of
the Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated provides as follows:

Following an arrest a period of fifteen minutes shall elapse from the time the
violator is stopped before administering any test prescribed by subsection A of this
section. During this period of time the violators shall be informed that their license or
permit to drive will be suspended or denied if they refuse to submit to the test.
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Based on Gursey a DWI suspect has no right to delay, as
opposed to no right to assistance of counsel, before submitting to a
chemical test. The court countermanded the argument that an
Arizona DWI defendant has a right to assistance of counsel before
5
submitting to a sobriety test by citing Campbell v. Superior Court. 10
In Campbell the court held that the defendant "was not entitled to
assistance of counsel in deciding whether . . . to submit to a
breathalyzer test." ' 10 6 Whether the court in McNutt intended to
expand Campbell by allowing the defendant to call an attorney
before submitting to a breathalyzer when it caused no undue delay
or interference remains unclear.
A second issue raised by the McNutt opinion is whether the
court created a double standard regarding the right to counsel for
indigents and for those who could afford counsel. The court held
that the State's action in denying the defendant an opportunity to
call his attorney and arrange for an independent test violated rule
6. 1(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides
a defendant with the "right to consult in private with an attorney as
soon as feasible after a defendant is taken into custody. "107 The
court's holding, however, limited this right to counsel to those who
can afford counsel. The indigent defendant had a right to counsel
after submitting to a breathalyzer test if he could afford it,
otherwise the state allowed him to call a friend or relative.1 08
Therefore, under McNutt a person charged with DWI had a right to
call and have his attorney arrange for an independent test if the
defendant could afford an attorney.
As noted above, several jurisdictions held that the denial of an
opportunity to obtain an independent blood test violated due
process. Section 39-20-02 of the North Dakota Century Code 0 9
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (B) (Supp. 1981-1982).

105. McNutt, 133 Ariz. at __
n.2, 648 P.2d at 125 n.2 (citing Campbell v. Superior Court,
106 Ariz. 542, 479 P.2d 685 (1971)).
106. Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, -_, 479 P.2d 685, 693 (1971).
107. McNutt, 133 Ariz. at __

, 648 P.2d at 124. For the text of rule 6. l(a), see supra note 9.

108. 133 Ariz. at n.2, 648 P.2d at 125 n.2. But see State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436,
-,
610 P.2d 893, 899 (police officer should provide indigent defendant with access to phone and
number of public defender organization or numbers of attorneys willing to represent indigent
clients), vacatedsub noma.Washington v. Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. 977, aff'don remand, 94 Wash. 2d 858,
620 P.2d 999 (1980).
109. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (1980). Section 39-20-02 of the North Dakota Century Code

provides as follows:
Only a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist, or registered nurse acting at
the request of a law enforcement officer may withdraw blood for purpose of

determining the alcoholic content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking
of breath, saliva, or urine specimen. The person tested may have a physician, or a
qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, or other qualified person of his own
choosing administer a chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the

direction of a law enforcement officer. The failure or inability to obtain an additional
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provides that a defendant charged with DWI has the right to have a
second test administered by a qualified person of his own choosing.
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue of
0 In Larson
suppression of exculpatory evidence in State v. Larson. 1"
the court held that the State is not required to provide a sample of
the defendant's breath, taken at the time of the breathalyzer test, to
the defendant for an independent test."' The court determined,
however, that a person could have a qualified person of his own
choosing administer a second test."1 2 The court concluded that
section 39-20-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, which
permitted a defendant to obtain an independent test, provided a
DWI defendant a fair and reasonable opportunity to impeach the
breathalyzer results and met the constitutional due process
standards." 3 Therefore, by statute North Dakota only allows the
defendant the right to obtain an independent test at his own
expense if he requests one, but does not require the state to provide
the defendant with a sample of the defendant's breath taken at the
time of the initial breathalyzer test. "14
Under McNutt the defendant had a right to contact an attorney
to arrange an independent test during the crucial time period
following the arrest and testing."15 The McNutt court based this
holding on the state right to counsel." 6 North Dakota does not have
a state rule similar to the Arizona rule that concerns the right to
counsel. 1 17 In State v. Iverson,1"8 however, the North Dakota
test by a person shall not preclude the admission of the test or tests taken at the
direction of law enforcenent officer. Upon the request of the person who is tested, full
information concerning the test or tests taken at the direction of the law enforcement
offier shall be made available to him.

hi.
110. 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981).
111. State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750, 752 (N.D. 1981). ContraState v. Peyatt, 130 Ariz. 541,
('37 P.2d 751 (Ct. App. 1981) (police must advise a suspect that they will take a second sample of his
breath and preserve it fbr his use and that failure to do so will result in suppression of results of breath
test).
112. 313 N.W.2d at 752-53.
113. 313 N.W.2d at 753. In Larson the court reasoned that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that the test ampoule could provide material evidence concerning his guilt or punishment.
hliat 756. But see Scales v. City Court, 122 Ariz. 231, 594 P.2d 97 (1979) (destruction of breathalyzer
test ampoules violated defendants' right to due process).
114. 313 N.W.2d at 752-53.
115. McNutt, 133 Ariz. at
, 648 P.2d at 124.
116. Id. (construing ARiz. R. CRI. P. 6.1 (a)). For the text of rule 6. l(a) of the Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure, see supra note 9.
117. But see N.D.R. CRIM. P. 44. Rule 44 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides as follows:
Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, every indigent defendant shall be
entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense to represent him at every stage of
the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate through appeal in all
felony cases. Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, every indigent defendant shall
be entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense to represent him at every stage
of the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate through appeal in
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Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to counsel at a
critical stage of the proceedings against a defendant and that a
preliminary hearing was a critical stage in the proceedings. 119
20
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona1
recognized that a defendant has a right to an attorney when there
has been a "custodial interrogation" and the defendant requests
counsel.1 21 In State v. Field 22 the North Dakota Supreme Court
indicated that Miranda warnings were necessary before questioning
a person taken into custody and arrested for DWI. 123 When the
police warn a DWI suspect of his right to counsel under Miranda, he
may be tempted to refuse the sobriety test 1 24 until his attorney
26
arrives 25 or until he can consult with an attorney by telephone.1
In Agnew v. Helle,127 however, the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that there was no constitutional right to consult with an
attorney before deciding to take a chemical test, notwithstanding
Miranda warnings. 28 The court considered proceedings under the
all nonfelony cases unless the magistrate has determined that sentence upon conviction

will not include imprisonment. The court shall appoint counsel to represent a
defendant at his expense if he is unable to secure the assistance of counsel and is not
indigent.
Id. See also N.D. CONST. art. I. § 12 (the party accused has the right to appear and defend in person
and with counsel); N.D.R. CRIM. P. 5 (an arrested person shall be brought before the nearest
available magistrate without unnecessary delay; the magistrate shall inform the defendant of his right
to appear and defend in person or by counsel).
118. 187 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1971).
119. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 35 (N.D. 1971). In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972),
Justice Stewart in a plurality opinion indicated that there is no right to counsel before "the initiation
of adversary judicial criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information or arraignment." Id. at 689. See City of Tacoma v. Heater, 67 Wash. 2d
733, -,
409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966) (critical stage in the case of DWI arose immediately after the
police officers had conducted their sobriety tests, interrogated the defendant, and charged him with
the offense).
120. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
121. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
122. 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1980).
123. State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404, 409 (N.D. 1980). See Hammeren v. North Dakota State
Highway Comm'r, 315 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1982) (failure of arresting officer to inform defendant of
consequences of refusal to take breathalyzer test may preclude suspension of driver's license if there
is sufficient evidence of confusion).
124. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 (1983) (defendant's refusal to take blood
alcohol test admissible into evidence at trial).
125. In Minnesota if an attorney arrives at the jail within a reasonable time that does not affect
the validity of the implied consent testing, the State must allow a private consultation between the
attorney and his client. The State must then afford the arrested person an opportunity to submit to
the test. State Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Kneisl, 312 Minn. 281, 286, 251 N.W.2d 645, 649 (1977).
126. See Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.) (phoning attorney before submitting
to chemical test sufficient to provide defendant with adequate legal assistance and a fair trial), vacated
as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, -, 239 N.E.2d 351, 353,
292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (1968) (defendant's request would not have substantially interfered with
investigative procedure because call to attorney would have been concluded in a matter of minutes);
cf. State v. Held, 311 Minn. 74, 76, 246 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1976) (because of potential security
problems suspect does not have right to phone attorney from private room or booth).
127. 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1974).
128. Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 297 (N.D. 1974). North Dakota follows a number of
other jurisdictions that hold that because proceedings under implied consent laws are civil in nature,
there is no right to counsel. See Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966);
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North Dakota implied consent laws to be civil in nature. 129 Because
a defendant had no right to counsel in a civil proceeding, the
defendant had no right to counsel before deciding to take a
breathalyzer test.130 The North Dakota Supreme Court has never
addressed whether a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel
immediately following a DWI arrest and the administration of a
breathalyzer test. 131
The McNutt court applied constitutional standards of due
process and state statutory law to provide the defendant with the
right to obtain an independent test. 1 32 Although the McNutt
decision was unclear about whether there was a right to consult
with an attorney before submitting to a chemical test, the Arizona
Supreme Court recognized a right to counsel immediately
following administration of the test. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has taken the position that there is no constitutional right to
33
consult with an attorney before deciding to take a chemical test.1
Based on State v. Larson, however, the defendant has a right to call
his attorney after submitting to a breathalyzer test to arrange for an
34
independent test. 1
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Finocchairo v. Kelly. 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427. 226 N.Y.S.2d 403, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912
(1962): Seders v. Powell. 298 N.C. 453,
- 259 S.E.2d 544. 550 (1979): Blow v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles. 83 S.D. 628. 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969).
129. 216 N.W.2d at 298.
130. d.
131. See generally Comment. Implied Consent Laws: Some Unsettled Constitutional Questions. 12
RTGERs L. J. 99 (1980) (further case law on the constitutional right to counsel in DWI proceedings).
132. McNutt %'.Superior Court. 133 Ariz. 7. .
648 P.2d 122. 124 (1982).
133. Agnew v. Hjelle. 216 N.W.2d 291. 297 (N.D. 1974).
134. 313 N.W.2d 750. 752-53 (N.D. 1981). In Larson the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
Pursuant to Isection 39-20-02 of the North Dakota Century Code] a person upon
whom a law enfbrcement officer has administered a chemical test can have any
qualified person of his own choosing administer a test or tests for his own use. If that
person desires samples of his breath lbr independent testing he has the right to acquire
those samples himself with the assistance of any qualiiedperson he chooses.
State %-.Larson. 313 N.\. 2d 750. 752-53 (N.D. 1981) (emphasis added).

